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The coming multi-order world
Trine Flockhart
School of Politics and International Relations, University of Kent, Canterbury, England
ABSTRACT
The article shows that the current international system is changing towards a
completely new form of international system, conceptualized as a multi-order
system. The suggestion for a multi-order world stands in contrast to three
current narratives about the future global order expressed through a
multipolar narrative; a multi-partner narrative and a multi-culture narrative.
The article demonstrates that although each narrative points to a plausible
future, neither fully captures what lies ahead. Using English School concepts
such as order, international society, international system and primary and
secondary institutions, the article reveals a conception of the coming
international system as a system consisting of several different ‘orders’ (or
international societies) nested within an overall international system. In the
coming ‘multi-order world’, the liberal order will continue, and may even be
strengthened internally, but its global reach will be a thing of the past.
Moreover, the challenge in a multi-order world will be to forge new forms of
relationships between composite and diverse actors across complex lines of
division and convergence. Scholars and policy-makers should note that the
coming multi-order world will be radically different, requiring new thinking
and new institutions and the acceptance of diversity in both power and
principle.
The international system appears to be in flux and the liberal international
order that was established after the Second World War in peril. Most agree
that global power is shifting as new powers rise and old ones re-assert them-
selves and that the arrival of new actors such as Daesh (ISIS) suggest that the
values underpinning the existing order are not shared by all. At the same time
strategic forecasting point consistently to major change in political structures,
demographics, technology, resources, economics and the environment, which
are likely to further question the existing order and to place increased
demands on its institutional capacities to meet common challenges.1 Yet,
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despite the compelling evidence that major change is taking place and will
accelerate in the years to come placing the existing international order and
its institutions under pressure, there is little agreement on what kind of inter-
national order is in the making or indeed how best to meet the many emerging
challenges.
The transformation of the existing international order has been debated for
some time in the scholarly literature. There is a significant, and growing lit-
erature on the crisis of liberal order, great power management and the role
to be played by the current hegemon – the United States.2 At the 2015
Munich Security Conference, it also became apparent that the worry
expressed in the scholarly literature had percolated up to the policy level as
key decision-makers voiced their concerns about new dangers and cracks in
the international order.3 The conference theme, ‘Collapsing Order, Reluctant
Guardians’ expressed in a poignant manner the dangers facing the existing
order and the weaknesses in the institutions underpinning it, and, most
importantly, it revealed a growing awareness amongst the policy elite of the
challenges to the principles on which the order has rested since the Second
World War.4 Moreover, following the terrorist attacks in Paris, the lock-
down of Brussels, the downing of a Russian passenger plane and the shootings
in Tunisia and California as well as the very visible refugee crisis and the per-
nicious humanitarian disaster in Syria, the concern has clearly spread to the
public level, which is bound to have (domestic) political consequences that
probably will not enhance the prospects for finding common solutions.
There is a now widespread agreement that major change is in the making
and that the international order of the past seven decades is in question.
However, it is not clear what might be done to rescue it or – if rescue
fails – what might replace the current order. In fact the more the future of
the international order – and by implication the role of the United States as
the main sponsor of the order – is discussed in the accumulating literature,
the more it seems that our understanding of the key question to be addressed
– how order is produced and maintained – is incomplete and conceptually
weak and that we as a result have not fully anticipated the coming
international order.
This article seeks a better understanding of the changes taking place and of
what kind of international order is emerging and how to best ensure a peace-
ful transition to a new global order characterized by diversity in power, prin-
ciples and institutions. The article seeks to contribute to an already crowded
field by offering a theoretical and conceptual account of the changes taking
place and of what might emerge as a result of the current changes. To do
so requires probing into what is meant by order and to take a deep look at
its constitutive components to identify which components of the current
order should be, or can be preserved, and which ones need to be reformed


























are likely to be able to facilitate continued cooperation in a strategic environ-
ment where traditional approaches appear to be faltering. To help in this
effort, I revisit English School theory, in particular Hedley Bull’s concepts
of order, institutions, international system and international society.5
The article is divided into five main sections, starting with a brief outline of
three competing narratives on what kind of global order is in the making.
Although each narrative contributes with valuable insights, neither is able to
offer a complete picture of what kind of international order may result from
the current changes, because neither considers fully how – and where –
order is constituted and maintained. In the second section, the article turns
to a conceptual enquiry into what is meant by order and how and where
order is produced and reproduced. I utilize insights from English School
theory to differentiate between order as a condition characterized by the
achievement of three fundamental goals related to life, truth and property
and order as an object constituted through a set of activities and practices
linked to a specific set of values and institutions. The latter is what is often
described as ‘the international order’, but confusingly it is also functionally
equivalent to Bull’s key concept – ‘international society’. The problem is that
the concepts ‘order’, ‘the international order’ and ‘international society’ are dif-
ficult to separate, and that the focus in the current debate on ‘the international
order’ appears to actually be about changes in the ‘international system’ – albeit
without a clear distinction being offered between system, society and order. I
argue that a first step towards clarity on the current process of transformation
is a conceptually founded understanding of the distinction between order pro-
duced by the international system and order that is produced by international
society.6
In the third section, I develop an ideal-typical international order allowing
me to focus on the components and the constitution of ‘international orders’ –
or international societies. I argue that all orders consist of four constitutive
parts and that it is through the constellation and character of all four
components that the specific character of ‘the international order’ is forged.
In the fourth section, I turn to the character of the international system and
its relationship with international society and how the character of orders
or societies within the system influence the system. In the fifth section, I
demonstrate that the current characteristics of the international system are
different from the past international systems of multipolarity, bipolarity and
unipolarity and that the next international system is likely to consist of
several ‘orders’ with multiple overlapping and diverging characteristics
nested within an overall international system in which a complex network
of ‘inter-order’ relationships will determine the character of the coming
‘multi-order world’. The article concludes that the challenge ahead will be
to safeguard the liberal international order, whilst also forging many different
and new forms of relationships to manage the coming multi-order world.

























Narratives of emerging order
The literature on the changing strategic environment and emerging global
order is extensive and a full engagement with it is beyond the scope of this
article. Nevertheless, it is possible to roughly divide the existing literature
on the emerging global order into three broad narratives – which I have
labelled as a multipolar future, a multi-partner future and a multi-cultural
future. All three narratives have in common that they focus primarily on
the role and future prospect of the current liberal international order and
they all anticipate a more diverse international system composed of new
and emerging (great) powers. However, they differ on important issues,
especially on how order is produced and maintained which leads them to
very different interpretations on the future prospects for the current liberal
order and on the role to be played by the current leader of that order – the
United States. A little polemically one could say that the multipolar narrative
harks back to the past, the multi-partner narrative seeks to extend the present
into the future and that the multi-cultural narrative looks to a profoundly
different future.
A multipolar future
The first narrative is probably the most commonly articulated narrative in the
media and in policy circles and it is backed up by a substantial scholarly lit-
erature. It suggests that we are currently witnessing a return to the kind of
balance of power politics that characterized the multipolar system of the
19th and early 20th centuries. The narrative starts from the premise that as
new powers rise, the unipolar moment7 is over and will be replaced with
global multipolarity8 in which the relationship between the United States
and China is likely to be by far the most important.9 The narrative emphasizes
material capabilities, especially military and economic power, stressing that
military power rests on economic strength, which leads to the persuasive
argument that as rising powers increase their economic strength, they are
likely to also increase their military power.10 Given the importance of econ-
omic power and its link to military power, the rise of China and China’s
status as the second largest economy therefore receives a great deal of
attention.11
The narrative is rooted in the realist tradition, which emphasizes the
pursuit of the national interest and material capabilities12 and which sees
anarchy and the balance of power as the key ordering principles in an inter-
national system that is largely assumed to be moving towards multipolarity.
Proponents of the narrative argue that balance of power politics continues
to offer a serviceable mechanism for maintaining tolerable levels of order


























narrative all emphasize balance-of-power politics and the importance of
national interests and although they all see a version of multipolarity unfold-
ing, they differ in their recommendations on how the United States should
respond to the altered strategic environment, and by implication, on how
they view the prospects of the existing liberal order.14
The narrative is split on the question of whether the United States should
balance against the rise of competing powers by maintaining its commitment
to existing allies, whilst seeking to prevent rising regional powers such as
Russia and China from establishing regional spheres of interest, or if the
United States should take advantage of its beneficial geographic position
and resource self-sufficiency and pursue a strategy based on offshore balan-
cing.15 In the former, the pre-eminent objective of the United States should
be to maintain – perhaps even to increase – its power and to balance
against rising states in all the traditional ways. In a recent Council of
Foreign Relations report, Robert Blackwill, Henry Kissinger and Ashley
Tellis argue that Washington needs a new grand strategy towards China
that centres on balancing China by revitalizing the American economy, by
strengthening the American military, expanding Asian trade networks, con-
trolling China’s access to advanced weaponry and military technology
whilst implementing effective cyber policies, reinforcing Indo-Pacific partner-
ships and energizing high-level diplomacy with Beijing.16 Depending on the
extent of such a policy, it is not far off being a policy of primacy, where the
power balance would favour the United States and it certainly advocates
the view that ‘superpowers do not get to retire’.17
In contrast, those who favour offshore balancing argue that the United
States should disengage from its extensive military commitments, and that
the policy of liberal hegemony and active engagement pursued since the
end of the Cold War has proved to be an expensive and counterproductive
grand strategy, which has made the United States the centre of political atten-
tion, produced anti-Americanism, and precipitated balancing against the
United States.18 With the changes currently underway in the international
system, the grand strategy of liberal hegemony, is likely to be even more
expensive and even more counterproductive. Proponents of offshore balan-
cing therefore argue in favour of restraint and that the United States should
make use of its beneficial geographic position and strong naval capacity to
focus on its own defence and its own society.19 Ian Bremmer presents the
case as ‘putting an end to our prohibitively expensive superhero foreign
policy’ and ‘instead of throwing money at other people’s problems’ start to
‘invest more money more wisely in American education, rebuild our infra-
structure, care for our veterans and all those who need help here at
home’.20 Such a policy would no doubt be politically persuasive amongst a
public that after two exhaustive wars has grown tired of shouldering the
cost of ‘policing the world’. Not surprisingly therefore, the policy is gaining

























ground and certainly has appeal at the public level. The strategy rests on the
belief that it makes no sense to take on unnecessary burdens or to allow allies
to free-ride on the generosity of the United States and that in any case, only a
few areas of the globe are of strategic importance to the United States.21
However, although offshore balancing is very different from the balancing
against China strategy, both visions of the future international order are
part of the same narrative, as they both see the emerging strategic environ-
ment as one of multipolarity and a return to past practices of balance of
power politics and as they both reject that the fundamental nature of inter-
national politics has altered in any significant way.22
A multi-partner future
The second narrative accepts that the rise of new powers will affect the coming
international order but it disputes that the rise of other powers will result in a
return to traditional power politics. The narrative is most closely associated
with liberal internationalism – in particular the form of liberal hegemony
advocated prominently by G. John Ikenberry in Liberal Leviathan.23 In
policy circles the narrative has most clearly been articulated when then Sec-
retary of State, Hillary Clinton argued that the international order of the
21st century would be a ‘cooperative architecture’ in a ‘multi-partner world’
rather than a ‘multipolar world’.24
Proponents of the multi-partner narrative stress that America remains an
enduring power and it maintains that the United States share more interests
with other powers than the multipolar narrative suggests.25 Nevertheless –
and rather surprisingly – the multi-partner narrative shares considerable
common ground with those in the multipolar narrative arguing in favour of
balancing against China. This is because both maintain that the United
States cannot withdraw from its global responsibilities and because both
assume the continuation of American leadership and active engagement.
However, the similarity between the two is lessening as the ‘primacy bal-
ancers’ continue to emphasize balance of power and American hegemony
as the key ordering principles, whereas the multi-partner proponents
acknowledge that the ordering principle in the coming international order
cannot be liberal hegemony, but must increasingly be based on partnership
diplomacy.26 In addition, the multi-partner narrative emphasizes the impor-
tance of institutions, rules and multilateralism as essential for maintaining
international order. For this reason they attach considerable importance to
the institutional framework established in the aftermath of the Second
World War although they acknowledge the need for reform of the existing
institutional architecture.
The multi-partner narrative accepts that change is taking place at a rapid


























crisis, but they remain optimistic that a reformed version of the current order
can be maintained in an altered strategic environment and that the soft
power of the order’s founding (liberal) ideas will continue to constitute mag-
netism to emerging democratic powers. Proponents of the narrative such as
John Ikenberry and Bruce Jones argue that the United States will remain the
leader of the order for the foreseeable future, although the United States will
have to adapt its leadership to the new realities.27 The crisis of liberal order is
not a crisis of liberal internationalism, but is rather a crisis of authority
brought on by the successful rise of new powers – in many cases achieved
through liberal order – which are now eroding the existing governance
arrangements of the order. More states are now seeking voice and authority
in the operation of the system, which means that the ordering principle of
hegemony must now be changed – partnerships, soft power and reform of
the (old) institutions is the way forward for maintaining liberal order in
the future.28
The multi-partner narrative is certainly more optimistic than the multipo-
lar narrative. It bases its optimism on the belief that the current liberal order is
highly resilient, able to adapt and open and easy to be joined by new rising
powers that wish to align with the current liberal order.29 Moreover, propo-
nents of the multi-partner narrative reject that liberal internationalism is cul-
turally specific to the West, but argue that it is simply a way of organizing the
world.30 The ‘multi-partner narrative’ therefore seeks to extend the present
into the future although it also accepts the necessity of adapting and repairing
those aspects of liberal order that are currently acknowledged to be in crisis
and which have clearly failed to deliver on the liberal promise of freedom
and prosperity.
A multi-cultural future
The third narrative is much more diverse and multifaceted than the two pre-
vious narratives. The narrative is difficult to pinpoint exactly because it antici-
pates a world that is marked by diverse regional sub-systems and which is at
once globalized, diversified and localized.31 It is not possible to locate the nar-
rative in a particular theoretical approach except that the proponents of the
narrative are more sensitive to history and cultural specificities and view lib-
eralism and liberal order as a product of social and economic conditions that
were unique to Europe and to the ‘new world’ initially populated by peoples of
primarily European descent. Common to the proponents of the narrative is a
more historical and cultural approach seeking to understand the developmen-
tal trajectories and social and economic forces and emphasizing the impor-
tance of culturally specific identities and the resultant different views on
political legitimacy, the nature of sovereignty, the rules of international
trade and the relationship between state and society.32

























One of the most prominent examples of the multi-cultural narrative is
Charles Kupchan’s ‘No One’s World’. Kupchan argues that the West is
losing not only its material primacy as new powers rise, but also its ideological
dominance.33 In Kupchan’s view Asia is likely to be the main beneficiary of
the ongoing global changes, but even so it is doubtful that any country,
region or model will dominate the next world. The emergent international
system will be populated by numerous centres at different stages on their
way to multiple versions of modernity and so will belong to no one in particu-
lar.34 Kupchan argues that the development of the Western liberal order is the
result of a specific journey to modernity, which has resulted in three defining
features: liberal democracy, industrial capitalism and secular nationalism.35
The problem is that these defining attributes of the West cannot be
assumed to be the defining attributes of developing regions and rising
powers, which will have major implications for order-making at the global
level. The challenge in ‘no ones world’ will be to establish a global consensus
on the fundamental terms of a new order and to manage the peaceful trans-
formation towards it – yet doing so will have to take place across culturally
dividing lines.36
Amitav Acharya also sees a world in which Western hegemony is at an end
and dominance by any single power is over.37 Acharya suggests that the
American-led order is in the process of being replaced with a ‘multiplex
world’ – a world of diversity and complexity, a decentred architecture of
order management featuring old and new powers with a greater role for
regional governance linked together by networks and institutions.38 The mul-
tiplex position implies two possible approaches to order: a global concert
model and a regional world model.39 The concert model assumes that the
great powers will have a special responsibility in the management of inter-
national order, where the United States will continue to play a critical role
albeit sharing its power and authority. The regional model assumes a
greater role for new regionalism utilizing regional institutions such as the
EU and ASEAN to manage international challenges such as climate change,
humanitarian assistance, intervention and financial cooperation. However,
for the model to work, cooperation at the regional level must be complemen-
tary to the UN system, which in turn necessitates reform of the global insti-
tutions.40 If managed correctly Acharya argues that regions could acquire
the role as building blocs of world order.41
Where Kupchan and Achyrya emphasize emerging differences, Buzan and
Lawson point out that at the same time as power admittedly is becoming more
diffuse the degree of ideological difference amongst the leading powers is
shrinking, as nearly all states now adhere to a form of capitalism.42
However, despite the growing convergence in the economic sphere, they
acknowledge the existence of a wide span of governance structures, suggesting


























capitalist governance in a system they describe as ‘de-centred globalism’ in
which no single power – or cluster of powers – is pre-eminent.43 Buzan
and Lawson stress four principles of decentred globalism; global non-hege-
mony; responsible great powers; regionalization alongside globalization; and
that shared fates mean common security. Provided that these four principles
can be adhered to, which the authors acknowledge is not without question, a
new international society44 based on the principles of decentred globalism
could offer the prospect of managing competition between integrated but
diverse models of political economy.45
What the different proponents in the multi-cultural narrative have in
common is that they all foresee the replacement of American/Western hege-
mony with a more de-centred or polycentric system and acceptance that the
United States in particular and the West more generally will need to get used
to the fact that the vision of the universalization of liberal values is wishful
thinking. They all see an emerging global order characterized by diversity
and diffusion of power, of crisscrossing and overlapping multiple forms of
relationships and of many different forms of domestic governance and organ-
izational practices. The multi-cultural narrative agrees with the multi-partner
narrative that the challenge ahead will be to facilitate global cooperation
across dividing lines to address collective security problems such as climate
change, crime, trade, migration and arms control.46 But they do not share
the optimism that such cooperation can be forged according to Western prin-
ciples, nor that rising powers – either democratic or autocratic – can be
enticed into the current liberal order. Liberal order, they maintain, is a cultu-
rally specific construct and not ‘just’ a way of organizing the world. The order-
making principles in the multi-cultural narrative are similar to the order-
making principles in the multi-partner narrative, but with the important
difference that they do not anticipate the degree of Western leadership the
multi-partner narrative seems to rely on, and they acknowledge to a much
greater degree the importance of regional institutional frameworks and cultu-
rally specific governance arrangements whilst questioning whether the exist-
ing institutional architecture can muster a workable level of legitimacy across
the growing diversity.
Although each of the three narratives capture important qualities of the
current changes and challenges, the problem of anticipating what lies ahead
in global order is that although each narrative points to plausible futures,
neither fully captures the complexity of order-making in a rapidly changing
world. Without a conceptual understanding of order and how order is pro-
duced and reproduced each of the three narratives will remain ‘opinions’
on what lies ahead, which essentially require a choice between different order-
ing principles without first having spelt out how order is produced. In the fol-
lowing the article will turn to the more conceptual question of how to
understand order and how it is constituted and maintained.

























International order and international society
Hedley Bull wrote an entire book about order in word politics, which to this
day remains perhaps the most authoritative statement on the topic, although
it also left many important questions of relevance for this article unclear or
unanswered.47 Bull’s contribution to our understanding of order was never-
theless groundbreaking and his concept international society and the role
played by primary institutions in facilitating order may offer the current
debate on the changes in the liberal international order/international
system additional clarity and nuance.
To Bull order is a particular kind of social pattern of human activity to
facilitate the achievement of three elementary and universal goals of social
life related to life, truth and property. A recurrent theme in Bull’s work is
that without some minimum realization of security against violence, a
shared acceptance of the sanctity of promises and of the stability of the pos-
session of property, order in international politics would not be possible.48
English School theory assumes a sense of common interest in these elemen-
tary goals of social life49 and the establishment of rules to ensure behaviour
that encourages the realization of the goals and institutions that make these
rules effective.50 The institutions that are emphasized by Bull as essential
for producing and maintaining order are the balance of power, international
law, diplomacy, war and great powers, although other institutions might also
be relevant. It is through these primary institutions that shared practices and
international organizations and regimes (secondary institutions) emerge
which may contribute towards the realization of the three elementary goals
of social life and hence to produce order. It is this shared understanding
and acceptance of shared rules and practices that now appear to be in
question.
One of the most important contributions of Bull, and the English School
more generally, is the proposition that order may be found at three different
levels: the international system; international society and world society.51 In
the classic English School distinction, the international system is described
as ‘when two or more states have sufficient contact between them and have
sufficient impact on one another’s decisions to cause them to behave – at
least in some measure – as parts of a whole’.52 A society of states on the
other hand exists
when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common
values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound
by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in
the working of common institutions.53
Barry Buzan offers a more concise definition of international society as ‘the


























creation and maintenance of shared norms, rules and institutions amongst
them’.54 Whether Bull’s or Buzan’s understanding of international society is
preferred, it seems that the liberal international order is a textbook example
of an international society. In that sense the condition of order as the achieve-
ment of the three fundamental goals is to be found through the object as in the
international order.
Although English School thinking is built around the triad of ‘international
system’, ‘international society’ and ‘world society’, it is clear that Bull thought
that order would most likely be produced at the international society level,
and that the place to look for how order is produced is in the shared interests
and identity, norms, rules and institutions of the international society/order.
This is indeed a logical consequence of his definition of order, which placed
considerable importance on the role of rules and institutions – neither of
which figure in the definition of an international system. However, with the
expansion of the liberal order to a near global reach and as a result of the
long reign of liberal order’s common rules and institutions such as sover-
eignty, diplomacy, international law, balance of power, great power manage-
ment and war – as well as the complex system of derivative and secondary
institutions that has been established over the years, it has become difficult
to make a clear distinction between institutions that can be attributed to
the liberal international order/society or institutions that are systemic attri-
butes. Clearly if Bull’s definition of system is accepted, the institutions that
play such a prominent role in international politics are a part of the inter-
national society – the liberal international order – rather than systemic attri-
butes related to bipolarity, unipolarity or multipolarity.
The article will now turn to look more closely at the constitutive elements
of international societies and at the relationship between international society
and international system and how the two have developed and been deeply
intertwined over the past two centuries. Doing so requires first a development
of an ideal-type international society/international order.
Ideal-types of international orders
The three narratives outlined at the start of this article each identify different
forms of change and different challenges to what is essentially the same inter-
national order in the same strategic context or international system. Yet,
although each narrative provides important observations and each point to
plausible futures, none of the three narratives seem to be describing the
same phenomenon. Of course different interpretations of the same phenom-
enon is entirely possible given the complexity of the issues and the wealth of
empirical data available for interpretation and may simply reflect different
political and theoretical standpoints. However, it is also possible that each
narrative have a valid point but that much like the blind men trying to

























describe an elephant by touching different parts of it, they are ‘feeling’ differ-
ent parts of an overall process of change that is difficult to grasp in its entirety.
In this section, the article will therefore look at the individual constitutive
parts by setting up an ideal-typical form of international society.55 Having
an ideal-type international society should provide a starting point for a
better understanding of the many forms of change that seem to be taking
place in the current liberal international order – and perhaps in the inter-
national system – and a better idea of where those changes may lead.
Bull’s understanding of order and international society was the result of
conversations in the British Committee stretching back to the early 1960s.56
From this long conversation many different nuances appear and disappear
and it is sometimes difficult to get a clear picture of the precise argument.
Moreover contemporary English School theory is at the beginning of new
debates about types of international societies and debates about some of the
constitutive parts of international society such as the relationship between
system and society, the definition of primary institutions and the identifi-
cation of new ones, the importance of identity and the possibility of typologies
of international societies.57 Much work still needs to be done and space within
the confines of a short article do not allow for the depth of enquiry that a full
engagement with the issues at hand would require. What follows is therefore a
brief sketch and an invitation to further research on the possibilities emerging
from the starting point of the ideal-typical international society/order devel-
oped here.
In its most basic form an international society – or an international order –
may be understood as a cluster (or club) of sovereign states or nations with
shared values, norms and interest, expressed through a number of institutions
both primary ones that are informal and evolved (rather than designed) and
performed through fundamental and durable shared practices and secondary
ones that are formal and designed and which perform specific administrative
and regulative functions.58 The primary institutions have traditionally
included balance of power, diplomacy, international law, great power man-
agement and war, but the number of institutions that could be included is
potentially infinite. Moreover it is entirely possible to imagine an international
society/order with very few or under-developed secondary institutions, which
would simply indicate an international society with a low level of constitution-
alism. The level of constitutionalism in the current international order is a
relative recent addition and specific to the American-led order. In addition
to these considerations it seems clear that power and sovereignty must be
afforded a privileged position in the constitution of international society.59
Sovereignty is constitutive of a society comprising states and power is likely
to play a major role both in the internal management of relations within
the international society and in its external relations with other actors or


























international society is dependent on a shared identity, which will be
expressed partly in shared norms and values and partly in similarity in dom-
estic governance arrangements, cultural similarities and such like.
With these considerations in mind and building on the analysis from the
previous section, an ideal-typical international society can be thought of as
a cluster of sovereign states (usually) converging around a leading state,
where the society will be defined by power and identity and by its primary
and secondary institutions. Figure 1 is a graphical representation of such an
ideal-typical international society or international order.
. The power component is derived from the material capabilities and
resources available in the order – perhaps but not necessarily provided
by the order’s leading state. Power in a function of the ability of the
order (or its leading state) to provide public goods and meet common chal-
lenges. The power component also includes soft power derived from non-
material factors such as internal cohesion through a stable identity and
shared interests and magnetism through attractiveness and legitimacy.
Moreover, the power component will also be a function of the strength
and effectiveness of the order’s primary and secondary institutions.
. The identity component is derived from the order’s self-understanding, core
values and vision expressed through shared norms and social practice. The
identity may be rooted in religion, culture, ethnicity or ideology or other
strong identity signifiers. The identity is also likely to be reflected in the
internal domestic governance arrangements.
. The primary institution component is characterized by a number of durable
and recognized patterns of shared practices rooted in the values held com-
monly by the members of the order and embodying a mix of norms, rules
and principles.60 The primary institutions can be the institutions identified
by Bull such as diplomacy, international law and the conduct of war, but
Figure 1. The ideal-type international society.

























might also be durable and recognized patterns of shared practices that are
related to the identity of the order.
. The secondary institution component is characterized by an institutional
architecture designed to manage relations between states within the inter-
national society and provide an organizational setting for meeting common
challenges and for providing public goods within the order and in the wider
system. The institutional architecture may display a high or low level of
constitutionalism either through many formal rules-based organizations
or through less formal relationships.
The character of an international society and its external and internal
resilience is constituted through each of the four components. Change
can occur in any one of the four component parts, but change in one com-
ponent is likely to transplant to other components as all four are inter-
linked and have at least a degree of mutual constitutiveness. The
possibility for different combinations and different characteristics in each
of the four constitutive parts seems to offer a wide scope for variation.
Indeed, it may well be that each of the three narratives introduced in
this article have merely focused on change and challenges in different com-
ponents of the liberal international order as change may be taking place
across all four constitutive parts.
The central question to ask when assessing if a cluster of states can be said to
be an international society has to be if the participating states share a common
interest in maintaining the order. Such a shared interest is likely to be more
robust if they also share similar internal/domestic settings and when participat-
ing state benefit from staying a member. The resilience of the international order
will therefore depend on howmuch the members of the international order have
in common and how much they want to be members of the order. The sub-
stance of the international order will depend on the identity and dominant
values, principles and practices defining the order.61 For most of the past 200
years liberal order has been the only international society, only interrupted
with the Soviet order providing an alternative during the Cold War.
However, other forms of order based on different values and entailing different
primary and secondary institutions are possible as seen in the past and in the
current suggestions for a Sinitic order, Putin’s attempt at establishing a Eurasian
order and the proclamation by Daesh of a Caliphate. Each of these are likely to
have the same four constitutive parts albeit that their content is likely to be very
different from the constitutive parts of liberal order.
The possibility of different international societies clearly begs the question
of how different orders might coexist and it raises the question of the relation-
ship between system and society and what kind of dynamics are likely


























The relationship between system and society
Bull’s definitions of ‘international system’ and ‘international society’ seem at
first sight straightforward. Yet the relationship between the two is not clear
and it is not easy to see where system ends and society begins. What separated
‘society’ from ‘system’ in Bull’s writings was that ‘system’ referred merely to
contact between states and the impact of one state on another, whereas inter-
national society also involved common interests and values and common
rules and institutions.62 As we have seen, order produced through inter-
national society is associated with the participating states having a sense of
common interest and they are following established ordering practices associ-
ated with commonly held values. Order at the system level, on the other hand,
appears from Bull’s definition to be limited to physical interaction and stra-
tegic calculation about the effects of interaction.63 However, although this dis-
tinction seems valid, in practice it is problematic even to the point that Alan
James64 convincingly concluded more than twenty years ago that the inter-
national system is a meaningless idea as interaction without some degree of
social content is, if not impossible, of little importance.65
The distinction between system and society and the usefulness of the concept
‘international system’ is one of the contested issues in English School theory.66
Whilst system and society overlapped in both substance and geographic scope,
the distinction between system and society was of little consequence. However,
in a situation where liberal order may no longer have a global reach and may no
longer be the only international society, the question of which values, norms
and institutions belong in the liberal international society and which belong
in the international system becomes more important. Moreover, the question
implies that international system and international society co-exist and have
a relationship that so far has remained under explored.
The position adopted in this article is that it is difficult to imagine an
international system that is not characterized by at least a minimum
degree of social relations and that an international system therefore is
likely to have some social attributes that are likely to be similar to those
in an international society. It is probable that the social relations and insti-
tutions at the international system level will be thin in comparison to those
at the international society level. However, as suggested by Alexander
Wendt, even thin social relations produce different ‘cultures of anarchy’.67
This can have important effects on the overall character of the international
system. Indeed this view seems to be in line with Bull who suggested that
interactions in an international system might take the form of cooperation,
conflict or indifference.68
The impossibility of an international system without some social relations
and without some systems-wide institutional structures might be taken to
mean that the concept has no value or that system and society simply

























represent two ends of a continuum between thin and thick varieties of the four
component parts identified above. However, this is not the view proposed
here. The concept ‘international system’ remains useful to denote overall ‘sys-
temic’ characteristics such as polarity and although systemic change is rare, it
does occasionally take place and when it does is likely to result in transforma-
tional change and to have significant repercussions at the level of international
society. In addition – and perhaps most importantly – a ‘system’ is qualitatively
different from a ‘society’. An international system will always be global in scope
whereas international societies potentially come in all shapes and sizes where
the current (near) global scope of the American-led liberal order, must be
assumed to be the exception rather than the rule. Being part of the international
system is simply not a choice that any state can make, but is an inescapable fact.
Moreover, the international system remains anarchical albeit that anarchy may
be what states make of it, and that there certainly is scope for different cultures
of anarchy and different levels of cooperation and institutionalization within an
anarchic international system. In international societies on the other hand –
especially in the case of the current American-led liberal order – anarchy
might be the formal ordering principle, but in reality it is tempered by other
ordering principles through potentially much thicker primary institutions
and through the possibility of a substantial degree of hegemony in the internal
management of the international society. Whilst this may not always be the
case, the possibility for a thick institutional order is much more likely in an
international society than in an international system.
The existence of both a system and perhaps several international societies
suggest that international societies are nested within an overall international
system. To be sure this suggestion sits uncomfortably with Bull’s view that
global order (as a condition) would be incompatible with ‘a welter of compet-
ing principles of universal political organization’.69 Yet, history offers plenty
of examples of co-existing international orders – most recently during the
Cold War. However, it does place considerable demands on policy-makers
to forge a form of systemic order that is cooperative rather than conflictual
and to aim for as high a degree of constitutionalism through the establishment
of global primary and secondary institutions as global ordering principles. In
the following the article will turn to a (brief) historical overview of how differ-
ent forms of international systems have varied across time – not just in terms
of their polarity, which is what traditional international relations theory has
focused on – but also in terms of the composition of different constellations
of international orders.
Varieties of international systems and orders
I have suggested in this article that global order should be thought of as multi-


























layer. To see why such a characterization is relevant, it is necessary to take an,
albeit brief, look at past orders and international systems. Figure 2 is an attempt
to illustrate the different forms of past international systems and the constella-
tion of the four identified international society components within them over
the past two centuries.70 The different shades in the ‘triangles within triangles’
suggest differences or similarities in the four constitutive components: power,
identity, primary institutions and secondary institutions. The figure shows
that the international system over the course of the last two centuries has under-
gone transformation only three times, where the third transformation from uni-
polarity to what I would suggest might be called a multi-order system is not yet
complete. With the analysis also including the international society level a more
nuanced representation becomes visible and the differences between past orders
and the emerging one move into view.
The multipolar system
It is widely agreed that the international system from the late 18th century was
a multipolar system until its prolonged process of transformation during the
first half of the 20th century ushered in a new bipolar system. Exhausted from
Figure 2. Varieties of international systems.

























war, the European powers were usurped by the two – at that time rising
powers – the United States and the Soviet Union. The multipolar system
was global, although only by virtue of the colonial reach of the European
powers, which allowed them to impose their own model on the rest of the
world. By the middle of the 19th century, Europe was the core region of a
global-scale political economy and imperial international society.71 This
meant that the international system and the international society overlapped
to such a degree that it became difficult to distinguish one from the other. The
system was multipolar because it consisted of more than two great powers
whose influence extended globally, whilst the international society was
characterized by a shared European identity, by the use of the primary insti-
tutions; balance of power, great power management and diplomacy, employed
through the secondary institution; the Concert system.
It is apparent that the international society in the multipolar system
underwent important change during the 19th century. The shared European
identity was challenged by budding national identities and although diplo-
macy and great power management were the most prevalent primary insti-
tutions from the time of the Concert of Vienna, once nationalism gave rise
to German and Italian unification, these gradually gave way to the balance
of power and war as the dominant primary institutions. Where the early
part of the multipolar system remained peaceful because the differences
in the power components were mitigated through great power management
and diplomacy, once these practices faded and differences in identity started
to appear, the limited level of constitutionalism in the embryonic secondary
institutions meant that the 19th-century international society became
managed through balance of power, which eventually caused it to break
down.
Although it is possible to talk of a European international society, it was not
a society that was characterized by thick primary and secondary institutions
and the shared identity between the members of the society was founded
on relatively weak foundations and certainly not supported by having
similar domestic governance arrangements. The development of each of the
four constitutive components of the order was characterized by serious set-
backs such as the failed revolutions in the mid 19th century and the rise of
nationalism, the slow development of secondary institutions and in particular
the rise of Fascism and Nazism, which ultimately contributed to the collapse
of the order.
The bipolar system
The bipolar world was also a multilayered system consisting of an overall
international system and two international societies. In the strategic environ-


























contained and more commonly referred to as ‘blocs’. The system was bipolar
because it had only two major powers.72 Both of these were so much more
powerful than all others that they became known as superpowers. Relations
between the two superpowers were conditioned by opposing identities
rooted in ideology and on a power struggle evidenced in extensive alliances
and a continuous build-up in military strength. The primary and secondary
institutions for order-making between the two superpowers were, however,
limited in scope and were employed in an unconstructive manner. For
example, the balance of power became known as the balance of terror and dip-
lomatic relations were used for espionage, propaganda and subversion, or
were obstructed through the use of veto in the UN. The many secondary insti-
tutions developed during this period were primarily geared towards order-
making within the two orders rather than between them. Only following
the close call of the Cuban missile crisis were limited secondary institutions
established to bridge the division between the two ‘blocs’ through the estab-
lishment of more direct diplomatic relations, the ‘hot-line’ and a series of
arms control negotiations.
Apart from the negative order-making at the systemic level, the two super-
powers were simultaneously the leading power within their respective ‘bloc’ or
international society. Within each international society a distinctive identity
and power base developed along with extensive, but wholly separate
primary and secondary institutions. In the American-led order the primary
institutions were mainly cooperation, multilateralism and negotiation,
expressed through the Western secondary institutions such as the Bretton
Woods system, NATO and a number of bilateral relationships in South
East Asia. In the Soviet-led order a similar process took place although the
primary institutions were based on centralized decision-making and collective
action, expressed through secondary institutions such as the Comecon and
the Warsaw Pact and various bilateral relationships with client states in the
Third World. In the American-led order, a major effort was undertaken to
change the previous identity based on nationalism, colonialism and a Euro-
pean identity, to a ‘Western’ identity based on free trade, rule of law, capital-
ism and ‘freedom’.73 A similar process, based on socialism took place in the
Soviet-led order, but to change the shared identity to one of socialist states.
In both international societies, the leading power exercised considerable influ-
ence over the members of their respective international society through the
bargain of offering security protection and a variety of economic incentives
in return for political acquiesce and acceptance of the principal power’s
leadership.
With hindsight it seems clear that the identity and the primary and second-
ary institutions of the Soviet-led order were weaker than those of the Amer-
ican-led order, perhaps because the internal power management in the Soviet-
led order was based on subjugation rather than negotiation, which affected the

























order’s magnetism and legitimacy. Once the internal cohesion of the order
could no longer be maintained through subjugation, the order collapsed
and most of its member states sought membership of the American-led inter-
national order.
The unipolar system
The system that emerged following the collapse of the Soviet-led order was
unipolar at the systemic level because it contained only one hegemonic
power. Such a system is widely assumed to be short-lived as it is anticipated
that an alternative great power sooner or later will appear on the horizon to
challenge the hegemon. I do not agree that unipolarity is inherently short-
lived, provided that it is supported with a stable universalized international
society. However, this is precisely the point – maintaining a global universa-
lized liberal international society appears to be, as Charles Kupchan expresses
it – wishful thinking!74
The unipolar system seemed nevertheless for a while to be supported by a
universal liberal international society. Francis Fukuyama boldly proclaimed
‘the end of history’ and the triumph of liberalism as the ‘final form of
human government’.75 The claim seemed at first vindicated by a wave of
democratization processes and in an unprecedented level of global
cooperation such as in the liberation of Kuwait. However, beneath the
surface all was not well in the four constitutive parts of the liberal inter-
national society and with the arrival of George W. Bush in the Oval Office,
things took a turn for the worse. The Bush Administration took unipolarity
and American hegemony as an opportunity to ride rough shot over long-
standing primary institutions such as multilateralism and the established
practice of negotiation and it ‘disrespected’ the cherished secondary insti-
tutions that were seen by many of the key members of the liberal order as
the cornerstones of the order.76 The perceived intransigence of the Bush
Administration sent shockwaves around the liberal order and had detrimental
effects on the multilateral institutions that for so long had been regarded as its
cornerstone.77
It soon became clear that the problems were not limited to the internal
cohesion of the liberal order, but that some states and non-state actors
rejected it altogether. This was of course most forcefully and tragically dis-
played in the attacks on New York and Washington in September 2001. It
has since become evident that the appeal of the liberal international order
and the legitimacy of its secondary institutions is not universal and that a
growing number of states – even some democratic states – are hesitant
about membership of liberal order. The acceptance of Western power and
institutions by non-Western states or colonies was apparently only skin


























international orders emerging, the cost–benefit calculations of states that do
not really share the fundamental principles rooted in aWestern identity there-
fore looks set to change. This seems to be precisely the kind of calculations
that some states – such as Turkey, Brazil, India, Russia and others have
engaged in recently.
The multi-order system
Following the conceptual framework developed in this article, it can be seen
that the new emerging system is fundamentally different from the three pre-
vious international systems. It is ‘multi-order’ because the primary dynamics
are likely to be within and between different orders, rather than between mul-
tiple sovereign states. With inspiration from the suggestion by Barry Buzan
that societies of states are ‘second-order societies’ because its members are
not individuals but collective entities, the emerging system appears to be a
‘second-order system’ because its members are not individual states but col-
lective entities comprising states.79 In a second-order system, relationships are
likely to be inter-organizational, transnational or supranational in character,
increasingly taking place within regional or order-specific secondary insti-
tutions (some of which may be supranational) or between non-state actors
or in many different public–private partnerships. New forms of relationships
between orders are likely to emerge, such as between the EU and ASEAN, EU
and African Union and the importance of international organizations across
different orders such as, for example, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
are likely to grow in importance. The many different connecting arrows in
Figure 2 between the different orders in the multi-order system signify the
many complex new as well as traditional relationships that are likely to
characterize a multi-order system. Neither of these relationships or the
dynamics they are likely to produce corresponds with the previous multipolar
system.
The coming system is more correctly characterized as multi-order rather
than multipolar because of its ‘second-order nature’ composed by clusters
of states with differences across all component parts. The multipolar order
shared a European identity, which although growing nationalisms gradually
undermined it, nevertheless remained the dominant identity of the great
powers until that identity was replaced by a Western identity. As shown in
Figure 2, the multipolar system displayed a degree of similarity in all com-
ponent parts of international society except the power component, but in
the multi-order world there is no such similarity in any of the component
parts. It must be expected that such across the board differences between com-
posite units in the system will have significant effects on the dynamics of the
system and call for new primary and secondary institutions for managing
complex and composite relationships.

























On the surface, it would appear that such a constellation might result in a
system composed of different regions as suggested by Acharya. However,
although regions and regionally based primary and secondary institutions
almost certainly will become more prevalent, this is only in so far that the
region coincides with the identity signifiers of international orders. In fact,
as pointed out by Buzan, rising interaction capacity renders geographic proxi-
mity of less importance, which logically means that regions should be weak-
ening.80 It certainly means that distance will no longer be a hindrance for
participating in specific identity-based orders. Australian participation in
the Eurovision song contest may only be the beginning of such trans-hemi-
spheral identity-based order membership. In the new system membership
of orders is therefore more easily attainable for states sharing common iden-
tity signifiers, but separated by distance. In that sense therefore identity, rather
than region, is likely to be the major defining feature of new orders.
As suggested in the multi-cultural narrative, the new system will indeed be
characterized by plurality of power and identity. However, the picture is
‘messy’ because strong identity signifiers may characterize some orders,
which, however, may be weak in terms of material capabilities and resources
and which may additionally display low levels of constitutionalism in their
primary and secondary institutions. This is, for example, what seems to
characterize an emerging international society based on a (radicalized)
Muslim identity. Alternatively orders based on Asian or Latin American iden-
tities, would be based on considerable material capabilities and resources and
a developing level of constitutionalism in both primary and secondary insti-
tutions, but a less strongly articulated identity and much less internal cohe-
sion. Finally the budding African identity is clearly accompanied with
efforts to establish a specific African institutional architecture to facilitate
cooperation at the regional level and with the ambition that Africa may
increasingly be able to take care of Africa’s problems. However, the shared
vision is hampered by a low level of constitutionalism in both primary and
secondary institutions and in domestic governance arrangements. In all of
these examples however, it is the emerging sense of a specific identity
couple with a wish to break free from what is increasingly perceived to be
Western dominance that seems to be driving the move towards a loosening
in the foothold of the current liberal international order.
The developments outlined here are as yet only in the making. However,
the signs seem strong enough to warrant the label multi-order system. More-
over, the label multi-order system does not reject the suggestions from the
third narrative that the system will be more regional, de-centred and influ-
enced by the convergence of economic principles through different forms
of capitalism, and characterized by increased divergence in political ideology
and religious belief and diverse forms of domestic governance structures.


























are needed to ensure a peaceful transition to the new system and to manage it
once fully in place. In particular the emerging system will need new ‘insti-
tutions of connectivity’ as connectors between the different orders and for
maintaining or developing order-based and system-based primary and sec-
ondary institutions that can both support the universal goals of social life
related to life, truth and property.
Challenges of the coming multi-order world
The analysis of this article has produced a picture of the coming international
order and international system that is very different from the three narratives
that were introduced at the beginning of the article. Rather than a choice
between the three narratives, it seems that the policy-makers in the coming
multi-order world may be facing all the changes and challenges that were out-
lined by the three competing narratives – plus the challenges associated with a
changed international system, where interaction will be between composite
actors in addition to the already complex relationships between states.
Changes are happening both at the international system level and at the inter-
national order level and reformed and strengthened order-making institutions
will be needed for both levels. New tools of statecraft will be needed for a
system where traditional primary institutions may have to contend with
dealing with composite actors such as competing orders rather than with tra-
ditional state-to-state diplomacy. Moreover at the international order level –
that is the internal dynamics of the liberal international order – changes are
underfoot in all four constitutive parts of the order, including weakening of
internal cohesion, and changes in the traditional primary and secondary insti-
tutions. It is indeed not surprising that the ongoing changes have been experi-
enced as unsettling and have been characterized as ‘compounding
complexity’.81
The task ahead is a tough one, where the details are still to be worked out
and where much strategic planning will have to rely on projected change
rather than change that has actually happened. Doing so is always a political
challenge. Three steps are needed in the short term to address the current
challenges and to prepare for a peaceful transition to the coming multi-
order world. The first and most immediate priority must be to prepare for
the coming multi-order world by taking steps to strengthen the core of
liberal order, paying attention to all four constitutive parts of the order
with special attention to re-establishing internal cohesion and reforming
the existing primary and secondary institutions. Clearly this priority suggests
that retrenchment and offshore balancing as suggested by some proponents of
the multipolar narrative should be resisted despite the short term advantages
such a strategy might bring and despite its undoubted domestic political
appeal. Secondly, narratives about the future and the conduct of foreign

























policy must now be based on acceptance that liberal values will not be univer-
salized, but that other orders will emerge that are likely to hold different
values. On this count the multi-cultural narrative holds significant value. Pol-
icies must be adjusted accordingly especially in the multi-partner narrative,
which should maintain its focus on establishing new forms of relationships
across dividing lines, but be better at working with partners on a more
equal basis without the (not so hidden) agenda of partners eventually
‘coming around’ to liberal ways. Thirdly, the need to think about ‘post-
Western’ systemic governance arrangement is now urgent. There is a need
to work towards establishing new global/systemic primary and secondary
institutions that are suitable for operating in the new multi-order system –
in particular institutions that are able to facilitate cooperation across dividing
lines between composite actors to meet the many collective security challenges
that strategic foresight analyses have shown to be waiting in the not very
distant future.
The good news is that the multi-order world is not yet a reality and that
there is still time to prepare for it. The lesson from Hedley Bull and the
English School is that order is produced both at the international society
level and the international system level and that life, truth and property is
best secured through shared rules, norms and institutions backed up by an
appropriate mix of soft and hard power. Moreover with a clearer idea of
what kind of international system is in the making, scholars and policy-
makers alike are much better equipped for constructing the right policies
designed for a new multi-cultural future where power is more evenly distrib-
uted rather than harking back to a system that ended in tears with two world
wars or believing that the remarkable cultural diversity of our globalized
world really will fit into just one idea about how to organize society and
achieve the good life.
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